Recently, one of the authors introduced a simple and yet powerful non-monotonic knowledge representation framework, called the Autoepistemic Logic of Beliefs, AEB. Theories in AEB are called autoepistemic belief theories. Every belief theory T has been shown to have the least static expansion T which is computed by iterating a natural monotonic belief closure operator T . This way, the least static expansion T of any belief theory provides its natural non-monotonic semantics which is called the static semantics.
Introduction
In recent years, various formalizations of non-monotonic reasoning and di erent semantics for normal and disjunctive logic programs have been proposed, including circumscription, CWA, GCWA, ECWA, stable, well-founded, stationary and static semantics of normal and disjunctive logic programs.
In 15, 14, 16] , one of the authors introduced a simple and yet powerful nonmonotonic knowledge representation framework which isomorphically contains all of the above mentioned non-monotonic formalisms and semantics as special cases and yet is signi cantly more expressive than each one of these formalisms considered individually. The new logic, called the Autoepistemic Logic of Beliefs, AEB, has been shown to constitute a powerful new formalism which can serve as a unifying framework for several major non-monotonic formalisms. It allows us to better understand mutual relationships existing between di erent formalisms and semantics and enables us to provide them with simpler and more natural de nitions. It also naturally leads to new, even more expressive, exible and modular formalizations and semantics 16].
Theories in the Autoepistemic Logic of Beliefs are called autoepistemic belief theories. As it is the case in Moore's autoepistemic logic, AEL, semantics of belief theories is de ned by means of introducing a class of their so called static expansions. Static expansions are xed points of a natural monotonic belief closure operator T . However, as opposed to autoepistemic logic and its stable expansions, every belief theory T has the least static expansion T which can be computed by iterating the belief operator T . This way, the least static expansion of any belief theory provides its natural non-monotonic semantics which is called the static semantics, namely the set of all formulae contained in the least static expansion T.
It is easy to see that if a belief theory T is nite then the construction of its least static expansion T will stop after countably many iterations. However, a powerful and somewhat surprising result obtained in this paper shows that the least static expansion of any nite belief theory T is in fact obtained by means of a single iteration of the belief closure operator T . This result eliminates the need for multiple iterations in the computation of static semantics and allows us to replace the xed-point de nition of static semantics by the equivalent explicit and straightforward de nition given by T = T (T ). Needless to say, the existence of an equivalent non-xed point de nition of static semantics signi cantly simpli es this notion and the underlying theory. It also provides the foundation for the interesting results and applications obtained in 5]. Let us prove that T minimally entails :Broken, i.e., T j = min :Broken. Indeed, in order to nd minimal models of T we need to assign an arbitrary truth value to the only belief atom B:Broken, and then minimize the objective atoms Broken; Car and Runs. We easily see that T has the following two minimal models (truth values of the remaining belief atoms are irrelevant and are therefore omitted): M 1 = fB:Broken; Car; Runs; :Brokeng and M 2 = f:B:Broken; Car; :Runs; :Brokeng. Since in both of them Car is true, and Broken is false, we deduce that T j = min Car and T j = min :Broken.
As in Moore's Autoepistemic Logic, the intended meaning of belief atoms in autoepistemic belief theories is enforced by de ning suitable expansions of such theories.
De nition 2.6 (Static Expansions of Belief Theories 14, 16, 15])
A belief theory T is called a static expansion of a belief theory T if it satis es the following xed-point equation: T = Cn AEB T fBF : T j = min Fg , where F ranges over all formulae of L AEB .
Thus a static expansion T of T is obtained by augmenting T with all belief atoms BF with the property that F is minimally entailed by the xed point T .
Theorem 2.7 (Least Static Expansion 14, 16, 15])
Every belief theory T has the least static expansion, namely, the least xed point T of the monotonic belief closure operator T .
More precisely, the least static expansion T of T can be constructed as follows. Let T 0 = T and suppose that T has already been de ned for any ordinal number < . If = + 1 is a successor ordinal then de ne:
where F ranges over all formulae in L AEB . Else, if is a limit ordinal then de ne T = S < T . The sequence fT g is monotonically increasing and has a unique xed point T = T = T (T ), for some ordinal .
The above result allows us to establish the following useful characterization of the least static completion of a belief theory. Observe that the least static expansion T of T contains those and only those formulae which are true in all static expansions of T. It constitutes the so called static completion of a belief theory T.
Example 2.9 Consider a slightly more complex belief theory T:
B:Broken ! Runs: B:Fixed ! Broken:
In order to iteratively compute its static completion T we let T 0 = T. T 3 = T (T 2 ) = Cn AEB T fBF : T 2 j = min Fg ;
we infer that B:Runs 2 T 3 . As expected, the static completion T of T, which contains T 3 , asserts that the car is considered not to be xed and therefore broken and thus is not in a running condition.
De nition 2.10 (Static Completion and Static Semantics)
The least static expansion T of a belief theory T is called the static completion of T. It describes the static semantics of a belief theory T.
Consequently, like the predicate completion semantics of a logic program P is completely determined by its Clark's completion comp(P), the static semantics of a belief theory T is fully determined by its static completion T. It is easy to verify that a belief theory T either has a consistent static completion T or it does not have any consistent static expansions at all.
Static Completions vs. Clark's Completions
It is easy to see that if a belief theory is nite then the construction of its static completion (or the least static expansion) will stop after countably many steps. However, a powerful and somewhat surprising result obtained in this article shows that static completions of nite belief theories T are in fact obtained by means of a single iteration of the belief closure operator T . This result eliminates the need for multiple iterations in the computation of static completions and allows us to replace the xed-point de nition of static completions by the equivalent explicit de nition given by T = T (T ).
The second, closely related result establishes a very interesting and somewhat intriguing relationship between static completions T and Clark's completions comp(T) of nite belief theories. It shows that the static completion T of a belief theory T coincides with Cn AEB T fBF : F 2 comp(T)g , i.e., with the set of formulae derivable from the belief theory T augmented with the set Bcomp(T) = fBF : F 2 comp(T)g. The latter set represents the set of beliefs in formulae that belong to Clark's completion. Even though, strictly speaking, the last result only applies to the so called residual theories (see below), we do not loose generality, as we will show that every nite belief theory can be transformed into a nite residual belief theory with an equivalent set of minimal models. Since Clark's completion comp(T) is easily computable, this result reduces reasoning under the static semantics to theorem-proving in the underlying modal logic AEB (this can be done either by hand or by using an automated theorem prover).
The proof of these two powerful results is based on the idea of adding to a belief theory T the set of formulae which ensure that models \seen" through the belief operator B are in fact minimal. As we will soon see, this task can be accomplished by a suitable generalization of Clark's completion but it only works for a restricted class of belief theories, namely those whose clauses do not have any objective premises. Such residual theories were previously introduced and investigated in the class of logic programs 6, 7, 9, 10, 4, 1]. Here we give a slightly more general de nition.
De nition 3.1 (Residual Belief Theories 1])
By a residual belief theory we mean an arbitrary belief theory whose clauses do not contain any objective (positive) premises, i. : :^BG k ! false _ BF 1 _ : : : _ BF n .
Now we describe a natural extension of the notion of Clark's completion comp(T). Clark's completion was initially introduced in 8] for the class of normal logic programs. Subsequently, its generalizations to disjunctive programs without positive premises were studied in 1]. Here we extend it to the class of all residual belief theories. As usual, the goal is to ensure that an objective atom A is true only if it really has to be true, i.e., if there is a rule with A in the head, in which the body is true and all the other head literals are false. One can easily see that this procedure represents a form of hyper-resolution.
De nition 3.2 (Extended Clark
As an immediate consequence of Propositions 3.3 and 3.4 we obtain the following important theorem which says that for any nite belief theory T, Clark T is a xed point of the belief closure operator T and thus is a static expansion of T. Since b T = T (T ) we conclude that b T is the least such xed point and thus coincides with the static completion T of T.
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The above result states that the static completion T of T is obtained by augmenting T with the set Bcomp(T res ) thus ensuring that all formulae that belong to Clark's completion comp(T res ) of T res are believed. It establishes an interesting and somewhat intriguing relationship between static completions and Clark's completions of nite belief theories. It also reduces reasoning under the static semantics (i.e., the computation of static completions T) to the easily accomplished computation of Clark's completion comp(T res ) together with theorem-proving in the underlying modal logic (which can be done either by hand or using an automated theorem prover).
As a consequence of the proof of the above result we immediately obtain the second of the two fundamental theorems obtained in this paper, namely a powerful and somewhat surprising result stating that static completion T of an arbitrary nite belief theory T is always obtained by a single iteration of the belief closure operator T (T ).
Theorem 3.8 (Explicit Characterization of Static Completions)
The static completion T of nite belief theory T is always obtained by a single iteration of the belief closure operator T (T ): T = T (T ). In other words, T = Cn AEB T fBF : T j = min Fg :
The above theorem states that the static completion T of T is obtained by augmenting T with beliefs BF in all formulae F which are true in all minimal models of the theory T itself. It eliminates therefore the need for multiple iterations in the computation of static completions and allows us to replace the xed-point de nition of static completions by the equivalent explicit de nition. In addition to Theorems 2.7, 2.8 and 3.7, this is the fourth characterization of static completions presented in this paper. Needless to say, the existence of an equivalent non-xed point de nition of static completions signi cantly simpli es this notion and the underlying theory. It also provides the foundation for the results obtained in 5]. Now we can apply the second formula of Proposition 2.3 to the rst conjunct (we already know that B:B:Broken belongs to the completion). Therefore T also contains B:Runs. We again conclude that the static semantics of T derives B:Fixed; Broken and B:Runs. Observe that while the above reasoning utilizes only one iteration of the belief closure operator, it is slightly more complex than the one used in Example 2.9 where several iterations were performed. Needless to say, both methods lead to identical results.
A Proofs of Theorems from Section 3
A. By the contraposition of the already proven opposite direction, the minimal model I 0 is a model of comp(T ), so it satis es the completion axiom. Since I 0 6 j = A, for every i there is a j such that I 0 j = A i;j or I 0 j = BF i;j or I 0 6 j = BG i;j . But since I 0 is smaller than I, I 0 j = A i;j =) I j = A i;j and I 0 j = BF i;j () I j = BF i;j and I 0 6 j = BG i;j () I 6 j = BG i;j . Thus, the right hand side is also false in I, but A is true in I, and therefore we conclude that I 6 j = comp(T ).2
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3.4
We will show that every belief theory T can be transformed into a residual belief theory T res by applying just two transformations, namely, \elimination of tautologies" and \unfolding".
It is easy to see that each application of GPPE, perhaps combined with tautology elimination, removes a given objective atom B from the body of one clause without introducing any new clauses containing B in their bodies. This means that a nite number of such transformations will lead to a belief theory that does not contain B's in bodies of its clauses. Applying this procedure to all objective atoms appearing in a ( nite) belief theory will therefore produce a residual belief theory.
Accordingly it su ces to establish the following lemma.
Lemma A.1 Let T 1 and T 2 be two belief theories such that T 2 results from T 1 by an application of GPPE or deletion of tautologies. Then T 1 and T 2 have the same minimal models.
The deletion of tautologies is an equivalence transformation, so it does not change the set of models, and thus also not the set of minimal models. Now suppose that we apply GPPE to a rule A B^R, where B is an objective atom, and suppose that B _ A i R i , i = 1; : : : ; n, are all the rules about B, i.e., rules containing B in their heads.
Since the new rules A _ A i R^R i , resulting from the application of GPPE, are logical consequences of the rules in T 1 , every model of T 1 is also a model of T 2 .
Let I be a minimal model of T 2 . We rst show that it is a model of T 1 (not necessarily minimal). Suppose this is not the case, so the rule A B^R is violated in I (this is the only rule in T 1 n T 2 ). This means that I j = B, I j = R, and I 6 j = A. Since in R i , and since we exclude multiple occurrences in the head, it is also not contained in A i . Thus, I j = R i and I 6 j = A i . But now we infer that the new rule A _ A i R^R i contained in T 2 is violated by I, which is a contradiction.
We now have to show that the sets of minimal models are equal:
Suppose that I is a minimal model of T 1 Let T B be the subset ofT which consists entirely of belief atoms, i.e. B comp (T res ) together with the axioms (CA), all instances of the axiom (DA) and all formulae forced in by the derivation rule (IR). Then the models ofT coincide with the models of T T B because the required closure under logical consequences does not change the set of models. 
